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Materialism can be defined as a value system that is preoccu-
pied with possessions and the social image they project. 
Veblen (1899) argued that for many people, social status is 
defined by possessions, and that this definition produces an 
endless drive to acquire ever more impressive belongings. 
Attempting to derive a sense of self-worth from materialistic 
pursuits appears, however, to be a dubious proposition. Indeed, 
a wide variety of correlational studies indicates that individu-
als who score higher in materialism evince lower levels of 
mental and physical well-being (for reviews, see Burroughs & 
Rindfleisch, 2002; Kasser, 2002). For example, Kasser and 
Ryan (1993, 1996) found that more materialistic individuals 
showed lower levels of psychological adjustment and social 
functioning. More materialistic values also predict higher lev-
els of anxiety and unhappiness (Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002) and 
are associated with lower-quality social relationships (Kasser 
& Ryan, 1993, 2001).
Although this literature has produced rich insights, its 
correlational nature raises two issues worth further consider-
ation. First, there is the matter of causality; it could be the case 
that materialism is a consequence of personal dysfunction, 
rather than vice versa. For example, attachment to possessions 
could arise as a compensation strategy among individuals with 
social-affiliation deficits (Clark et al., 2011; Lastovicka & 
Sirianni, 2011). Experimental evidence would help to bolster 
the case that materialism undermines well-being. Second, the 
individual differences perspective on materialism could be 
usefully augmented by research investigating situational fac-
tors that can activate materialistic thinking. It may be that 
many individuals, in the right circumstances, will adopt a 
materialistic mind-set, possibly to their personal or social det-
riment. Experiments manipulating potential situational trig-
gers of materialistic mind-sets are needed to explore these 
possibilities.
Culturally omnipresent consumer cues are obvious candi-
dates for serving as triggers of situational materialism. Con-
sider advertising. Although estimates of the average number 
of daily exposures to advertisements vary greatly, one of the 
most widely accepted estimates is 245 daily exposures (accord-
ing to the Advertising Media Internet Community, 1997). 
Contemplating the desirable goods in advertisements may be a 
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common route to the activation of materialistic mind-sets. 
Another common media practice is using the term consumers 
to refer generically to the public (as opposed to using other 
potential generic terms, such as Americans or citizens). A 
news story about American income-tax rates, for example, 
might focus on the impact of contemplated tax hikes on “con-
sumers.” By framing the news in terms of its relevance to a 
consumer identity, these messages may directly activate a con-
sumption mind-set in the audience. In the studies that follow, 
we developed experimental manipulations analogous to these 
features of everyday life situations to investigate whether such 
manipulations would situationally activate materialistic think-
ing and the unsavory social and psychological consequences 
with which dispositional materialism has previously been 
associated.
The possibility that materialistic mind-sets could have an 
immediate adverse impact on well-being is suggested by 
research showing that when particular values are situationally 
activated, an ensemble of corresponding values are likely to be 
co-activated, while incompatible values are inhibited (Maio, 
Pakizeh, Cheung, & Rees, 2009). Building on evidence that 
values can be classified into 10 broad categories that are 
related to one another in a circumplex structure (Schwartz, 
1992), Maio et al. found that activating values in one portion 
of the circumplex resulted in collateral activation of neighbor-
ing values, but inhibited values on the opposite side of the cir-
cumplex. Materialism should activate values in Schwartz’s 
self-enhancement quadrant, which focuses on wealth, achieve-
ment, power, and status; at the same time, it should deactivate 
values in the self-transcendence category, which prioritize 
concerns about other people. Feelings of dissatisfaction may 
arise from this pattern for at least two reasons. First, as Veblen 
(1899) argued, activation of materialistic thinking is likely to 
elicit a vicious cycle in which one feels continuously dissatis-
fied relative to individuals who own more (Ordapayeva & 
Chandon, 2011). Second, if materialism deactivates social 
engagement, it could undermine momentary feelings of 
belonging that have proven to be of central importance to 
well-being (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Helliwell & Putnam, 
2004).
Experiment 1
Our first experiment examined whether common indicators of 
impaired well-being previously shown to be related to disposi-
tional materialism—namely, negative affect and low social 
engagement—would be susceptible to influence by situation-
ally induced materialism. A pilot study was conducted to 
determine whether presenting depictions of luxury goods can 
activate materialistic strivings. Specifically, 47 undergradu-
ates were randomly assigned to view a series of either 24 
images of luxury goods (e.g., electronics, jewelry, cars, cloth-
ing) or 24 images of natural scenes devoid of consumer 
products, and to rate their pleasantness. Then, as part of an 
ostensibly unrelated study, participants completed a series of 
questionnaire items (using 9-point response scales) that 
included portions of the Aspiration Index (Grouzet et al., 
2005) that are commonly used to assess materialistic concerns 
(i.e., the Money, Social Image, and Popularity subscales). As 
shown in Table 1, the pilot study confirmed that exposure to 
desirable consumer goods increased materialistic aspirations. 
In Experiment 1, we sought to determine whether these same 
images could undermine mood and social engagement.
Method
Participants. Fifty undergraduates (28 female, 22 male; mean 
age = 18.84 years) participated as part of a requirement for 
their introductory psychology course.
Procedure and materials. Participants were seated in private 
cubicles. They were told that, prior to the main study, they 
would be asked to rate the pleasantness of visual stimuli that 
were being considered for possible use in research on visual 
perception. Participants were randomly assigned to view the 
same 24 images of luxury consumer goods used in the pilot 
study (consumer-cue condition) or 24 images categorized as 
neutral in valence in the International Affective Picture Sys-
tem (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008; control condition). 
Thus, the images in the consumer-cue condition were rated 
more pleasant than those in the control condition, but given 
our prediction of greater negative affect in the consumer-cue 
condition, this difference in stimulus pleasantness worked 
against obtaining support for our hypothesis.
The “main study” consisted of questionnaires that included 
items from the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and a measure of preference 
for social involvement. The PANAS items required participants 
to rate the extent to which they were feeling a series of emo-
tional states at the present moment, on a scale from 1 (very 
slightly) to 5 (extremely). Nine items, including sad and happy 
(reverse-scored), assessed depressed affect (α = .84); seven 
items, including nervous and distressed, assessed anxiety (α = 
.90); and three items, including guilty and ashamed, assessed 
self-dissatisfaction (α = .67). Preference for social involvement 
was measured by asking participants to indicate what percent-
age of their free time they would like to allocate to various activ-
ities. The list included social activities (e.g., participating in a 
student group, going to parties) and nonsocial ones (e.g., read-
ing, watching television); we summed the percentages allocated 
to the social activities to create an overall index of desire for 
social involvement.
Results and discussion
Participants in the consumer-cue condition reported signifi-
cantly higher levels of depressed affect and anxious affect 
(and marginally greater self-dissatisfaction) than participants 
in the control condition (see Table 1). In addition, they 
expressed significantly lower preferences for social activities 
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(see Table 1). Thus, situational exposure to stimuli that elicit 
materialistic mind-sets was indeed associated with the same 
indicators of lower well-being seen in studies of dispositional 
materialism.
Experiment 2
Our second experiment was designed to expand the prior find-
ings in two ways. First, we investigated a different situational 
cue to materialism by employing a task-framing manipulation 
analogous to the media’s consumer-framing of the daily news. 
Specifically, we framed the experiment as a study of “consumer 
reactions” (or, in a control condition, “citizen reactions”). Sec-
ond, we went beyond self-report measures to see whether mate-
rialistic mind-sets can also influence automatic reactions. We 
used the Evaluative Movement Assessment (EMA; Brendl, 
Markman, & Messner, 2005) to measure automatic evaluative 
impulses toward various personal values, particularly values 
that are central to materialism. To gauge automatic evaluative 
impulses, the EMA takes advantage of the tendency to approach 
positive stimuli and avoid negative stimuli. We examined 
whether participants’ automatic evaluative reactions to terms 
signaling materialistic values (i.e., words related to social status, 
success, wealth, etc.) would become more positive after expo-
sure to a consumer cue. On an exploratory basis, we also mea-
sured participants’ reactions to several other types of values.
Method
Participants. Fifty-eight undergraduates (37 female, 21 male; 
mean age = 19.7 years) participated, receiving $12 for the 
completion of two unrelated studies; the present study always 
came first.
Procedure and materials. Participants completed the ex- 
periment at individual computer stations. The experimental 
manipulation was conveyed by the initial task instructions, to 
which participants were randomly assigned. In the consumer-
cue condition, the heading for the instructions was “Consumer 
Reaction Study,” and the stated purpose of the study was to see 
“how well consumers can rapidly categorize objects.” At the 
end of the instructions, participants were asked to confirm 
their eligibility for the study by checking a box indicating that 
they were “an American consumer.” In the control condition, 
everything was the same except that the word “consumer” was 
always replaced with “citizen.”
Table 1. Effects of Consumer Cues on Participants’ Responses in Experiments 1 Through 4
Consumer-cue 
condition Control condition Comparison of conditions
Experiment and dependent 
measure      M     SD         M    SD t p d
Pilot study
 Materialistic aspirations 5.07 1.07 4.23 1.05 t(45) = 2.70 .01 0.74
Experiment 1
 Depressed affect 2.65 0.73 2.29 0.53 t(48) = 2.00 .05 0.55
 Anxious affect 2.02 0.90 1.41 0.46 t(48) = 2.98 .004 0.78
 Dissatisfaction with self 1.82 0.87 1.42 0.62 t(48) = 1.89 .065 0.51
 Hours allocated to social  
 activities (%)
31 7 38 12 t(43) = –2.38 .02 0.70
Experiment 2
 EMA: self-enhancement score 94.28 125.09 18.19 123.90 t(56) = 2.33 .02 0.59
Experiment 3
 Competitiveness 4.79 1.08 4.20 1.26 t(64) = 2.04 .05 0.49
 High-investment socializing 3.46 0.68 3.77 0.56 t(64) = –2.05 .04 0.48
 Low-investment socializing 4.42 0.40 4.14 0.74 t(64) = 1.99 .05 0.47
Experiment 4
 Feelings of responsibility 5.21 1.51 5.87 1.26 t(76) = –2.12 .04 0.47
 Feelings of obligation 5.44 1.39 5.82 1.25 t(76) = –1.28 .20 0.29
 Trust in other people 4.08 1.56 5.33 1.30 t(76) = –3.86 .001 0.80
 Viewing other people  
 as partners
4.69 1.42 5.49 1.47 t(76) = –2.43 .02 0.53
 Believing other people should  
 use less water
3.56 1.77 3.13 1.64 t(76) = 1.13 .26 0.25
Note: Variation in the degrees of freedom in Experiment 1 is due to missing data for one measure. EMA = Evaluative Move-
ment Assessment (Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2005).
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After being oriented to the task in one of these ways, par-
ticipants were asked to complete the EMA procedure. They 
were first given a list of the task stimuli, which fell into three 
focal categories: positive emotion words (e.g., happy), nega-
tive emotion words (e.g., sad), and non-emotion words. 
Although not described as such to the participants, the words 
in the latter category reflected a variety of social values. 
Of primary interest were words reflecting self-enhancement 
values (i.e., wealth, image, success, power, competitive). We 
also included words relating to conservative self-restraint 
(i.e., moderation, discipline, obedience, frugal, humble), to 
self-transcendence (i.e., honest, equality, helpful), and to 
self-indulgence (i.e., pleasure, enjoyment, indulgence, thrill). 
Participants were allowed to study the list until they under-
stood which stimuli belonged to each of the three focal 
categories.
To begin the EMA task, participants typed their name into 
a box. Then, they completed a simple categorization task that 
consisted of five blocks of trials. On each trial, participants 
saw their own name alongside one of the experimental stimuli 
(i.e., a positive emotion word, a negative emotion word, or a 
value-relevant word). Whether the stimulus appeared to the 
left or to the right of the participant’s own name was deter-
mined randomly. Participants were asked to move the stimulus 
word toward their name if it was a positive emotion word, and 
to move the word away from their name if it was a negative 
emotion word; they did so by pushing the left button on a 
response pad to move the stimulus to the left, and the right 
button to move it to the right. Instructions regarding the value-
relevant words varied by trial block.
In the first block, value-relevant words were not presented. 
In the second block, participants were instructed to move 
value-relevant words away from their name. Following the 
standard procedure (Brendl et al., 2005), we provided error 
feedback after anticipation responses (less than 100 ms fol-
lowing stimulus onset), late responses (more than 3,000 ms 
after stimulus onset), and responses in the wrong direction. 
Having familiarized themselves with the procedure for mov-
ing value-relevant words away from their name, participants 
completed the third block of trials using the same instructions. 
In the fourth block, participants were told to use a new rule 
regarding the value-relevant words, which should instead be 
moved toward their name. After practicing this response pat-
tern in the fourth block, they completed the fifth, and final, 
block using these new instructions. Within each block, presen-
tation order of the word stimuli was randomized, with the con-
straint that each stimulus appeared three times. Thus, in the 
critical blocks, participants responded to each of the value 
words three times (i.e., they moved each word away from their 
name three times in Block 3 and toward their name three times 
in Block 5). To the extent that participants had a positive eval-
uative impulse toward a given value term, response times for 
moving it toward their name should have been shorter than 
response times for moving it away from their name (see Brendl 
et al., 2005).
Results and discussion
After excluding trials on which participants responded incor-
rectly, we determined each participant’s mean response time 
for each item, separately for each movement direction (toward 
vs. away from name), and an EMA score was computed by 
subtracting the mean of the “toward” response times from the 
mean of the “away” response times. The larger the difference 
score, the more positive the evaluative impulse toward that 
stimulus. We then computed average scores for each of the 
four types of value items (self-enhancement, self-restraint, 
self-transcendence, and self-indulgence). These scores were 
analyzed as a function of the task-framing manipulation.
Although there were no significant or marginal effects 
involving the exploratory value categories, the critical, focal 
category of self-enhancement values showed the expected 
effect (see Table 1). Specifically, participants were faster to 
“approach” words reflecting materialistic values, such as 
wealth, image, and success, when the categorization task was 
framed as dealing with consumer reactions, compared with 
when the same task was framed as dealing with citizen reac-
tions. Thus, situationally activated consumer cues can reorient 
automatic response tendencies, bringing them into greater 
alignment with materialistic concerns.
Experiment 3
In Veblen’s (1899) influential analysis of materialism, the 
human tendency toward acquisitiveness and conspicuous con-
sumption reflects a competitive jockeying for social status 
(e.g., Ordapayeva & Chandon, 2011). Critiques of consumer 
economies have emphasized their tendency to engender com-
petitive rather than cooperative social orientations (Kasser, 
Cohn, Kanner, & Ryan, 2007). In our third experiment, we 
directly examined the effects of consumer cues on feelings of 
interpersonal competitiveness. In addition, we utilized a dif-
ferent manipulation of consumer cues. This time, we relied on 
a common experimental procedure for priming mind-sets: the 
scrambled-sentences task (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 1979).
Method
Participants. Sixty-six undergraduates (42 female, 24 male; 
mean age = 19.0 years) participated as part of a requirement 
for their introductory psychology course.
Procedure and materials. Participants were asked to com-
plete several experimental tasks on a computer in a private 
cubicle. The first one was presented as a study of “cognitive 
aspects of linguistic processing.” In reality, this was the prim-
ing task. Participants were given 30 word strings, each consist-
ing of five words. For each string, they had to select and order 
four of the words to form a valid English sentence. For partici-
pants randomly assigned to the consumer-cue condition, 20 
of these word strings (67%) contained a word related to 
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materialistic concepts (e.g., buy, status, asset, expensive). In 
the control condition, highly similar word sets were created 
except that, in each instance, materialistic concepts were 
replaced with mundane, nonmaterialistic ones (e.g., replacing 
the word expensive with the word accurate).
Next, participants completed an ostensibly unrelated sur-
vey study that included, among filler items, a three-item mea-
sure of competitiveness and the desire to outdo other people 
that was adapted from the Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale 
(Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003). Participants 
indicated their agreement with each statement (e.g., “Doing 
better than others gives me a sense of self-respect”) on a scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). To further 
explore the implications of materialistic mind-sets for social 
engagement, we also asked participants to rate their interest in 
pursuing a variety of social activities over the coming months, 
on a scale from 1 (not interested) to 5 (very interested). These 
included five high-investment activities (e.g., joining a student 
organization, volunteering for a good cause) and four low-
investment activities (e.g., watching a movie on television 
with friends, having dinner with friends). We expected that the 
negative effects of consumer cues on social engagement would 
be especially pronounced in the case of the high-investment 
activities, which involve cooperative (rather than competitive) 
social structures. For low-investment forms of social engage-
ment that do not require a particularly cooperative orientation 
or a concern for the common good, we expected the effects of 
consumer cues to be minimal.
Results and discussion
The measure of competitiveness showed good reliability (α = 
.81) and was influenced by the experimental manipulation in 
the expected manner (see Table 1); that is, participants in the 
consumer-cue condition reported a stronger desire to outdo 
other people than participants in the control condition did. In 
addition, situational activation of a materialistic mind-set 
resulted in significantly lower motivation for high-investment 
forms of social engagement. Unexpectedly, the consumer cues 
also elicited significantly higher motivation for low-investment 
forms of social engagement (see Table 1). This latter finding 
may reflect the fact that situational materialists are not devoid 
of social needs; being uninterested in more intensive, coopera-
tive forms of engagement with other people, they may instead 
opt for cheap-and-easy ways to satisfy their need to connect. It 
may also be that situational materialists appreciated the low-
investment, entertainment-related activities listed in our sur-
vey more for their hedonistic value than for their social value 
per se.
Experiment 4
Our final experiment further explored the social ramifications 
of situational materialism. To the extent that materialism 
reflects a competitive orientation toward other people, it is 
likely to be associated with selfish rather than cooperative 
behavior in social dilemmas. Indeed, past research has shown 
that dispositional materialists (who value money, fame, and 
other extrinsic rewards) are likely to take more from a limited 
common resource pool than individuals who value intrinsic 
rewards such as intimacy and self-acceptance (Sheldon & 
McGregor, 2000). In Experiment 4, we examined the ability of 
situational consumer cues to evoke similar antisocial reac-
tions. We used a consumer-framing manipulation to investi-
gate this issue.
Participants imagined themselves facing a water shortage 
that required restraint in their daily water use. They did so with 
the water crisis framed as affecting either various anonymous 
individuals or local consumers. Because “consumers” could 
potentially be regarded as a generic identity that is shared with 
other people (much as “Americans” could be a common generic 
identity), one might expect this framing to result in more proso-
cial behavior in a social dilemma. Indeed, prior research has 
shown that people involved in a social dilemma tend to show 
greater cooperative restraint in using a common resource if they 
feel that they have a common identity than if they are not united 
by some kind of shared identity (e.g., Kramer, 2011; Kramer & 
Brewer, 1984). However, we hypothesized that the competitive 
feelings associated with consumer identities would preclude the 
formation of feelings of trust and common cause that are other-
wise associated with shared identities; instead, we expected to 
see greater selfishness and mistrust among “consumers” than 
among “individuals” facing a resource dilemma.
Method
Participants. Seventy-seven individuals (43 female, 34 male; 
mean age = 32.0 years) were recruited from Amazon.com’s 
Mechanical Turk Web site. They received $0.25 in compensa-
tion for their responses to a brief online survey.
Procedure and materials. Participants were directed to an 
online survey that they completed on their own computers. 
They were asked to read and respond to a scenario involving a 
resource dilemma. Specifically, they read about a water crisis 
affecting a set of four different individuals who access the 
same well for their water. Respondents were asked to put 
themselves in the place of one of these individuals (“A”). In 
the consumer-framing condition, all of the references to the 
persons involved in the crisis used the term consumers, and the 
specific individuals were referred to as Consumer A, Con-
sumer B, and so forth. In the control condition, the term indi-
viduals was used instead (e.g., Individual A, Individual B, 
etc.) to refer to the parties involved. The description of the 
crisis indicated that, because of a drought, the local water sup-
ply was threatened, and the usual demand could not be met. 
Participants were then given information about past usage lev-
els of the shared resource, which revealed that Consumer A/
Individual A (i.e., the person they were role-playing) had been 
using more water than the others.
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After reading the scenario, participants provided a number 
of ratings on 7-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
Specifically, they rated (a) how responsible they felt for deal-
ing with the crisis, (b) how obligated they felt to cut their water 
usage, (c) how much they trusted the other parties involved to 
use less water, (d) how much they viewed the others as part-
ners, and (e) how much they believed that the others should 
use less water than they themselves did.
Results and discussion
As expected, the consumer framing resulted in lower feelings 
of personal responsibility for dealing with the resource 
dilemma, markedly lower trust in the other parties, and a sig-
nificantly lower tendency to view the others as partners in fac-
ing the dilemma (see Table 1). There were no significant 
effects on participants’ feelings of obligation or belief that the 
other parties should use less water than they themselves did. 
Unlike responsibility (which is a self-transcendence value 
related to benevolence), feelings of obligation involve confor-
mity values, and as such, they are not directly in conflict with 
self-enhancement concerns the way that self-transcendence 
values are (see Maio et al., 2009). However, in general, it is 
clear that the consumer identity did not unite—it divided. 
Thinking like a consumer again seemed to work against posi-
tive, cooperative engagement with other people.
General Discussion
These experiments consistently document the adverse, causal 
effects of materialistic thinking on personal and social well-
being. With its focus on extrinsic signifiers of value, the mate-
rialistic mind-set orients the individual to competitive concerns 
about relative standing, producing corresponding feelings of 
anxiety and dissatisfaction, and disinclination to trust other 
people and engage with them in deep, collaborative ways.
These results augment the rich literature on dispositional 
materialism by documenting the existence of situationally 
driven forms of materialism. The kinds of cues that triggered 
situational materialism in these experiments are highly analo-
gous to features of everyday life that are extremely common-
place in contemporary postindustrial societies. Advertising, 
which depicts an endless parade of desirable commodities, is 
highly similar to the pictorial primes we used as consumer 
cues in Experiment 1 (and the pilot study). Framing informa-
tion in terms of its relevance to consumers (rather than, e.g., 
citizens), as is very common in media discourse, is analogous 
to the framing manipulations we employed in Experiments 2 
and 4. Although we did not explore how long lasting the 
effects of exposure to consumer cues might be, the ubiquity of 
these sorts of triggering conditions in everyday life suggests 
that even if the effect of any given cue is not particularly 
enduring, it probably is not long until another one comes along 
to reignite materialistic concerns and their negative implica-
tions for affect and social engagement.
The present findings are related to earlier findings (Vohs, 
Mead, & Goode, 2006) that reminders of money orient people 
to independence and therefore lead them to prefer greater dis-
tance from others and to be less helpful toward them. Vohs 
et al. argued that “money brings about a self-sufficiency orien-
tation in which people prefer to be free of dependency and 
dependents” (p. 1154). Here, we showed that a variety of con-
sumer cues can have a broad range of psychological conse-
quences that include not only lower preferences for social 
contact, but also negative affect, competitiveness, mistrust, 
and diminished feelings of personal responsibility, as well as 
automatic activation of self-enhancement values. Although the 
concept of money is tightly connected to consumer mind-sets 
and luxury goods, it will be an interesting issue for future 
research to examine whether money is functionally inter-
changeable with other kinds of consumer cues. We have 
argued that consumer cues exert their effects through the 
activation of self-enhancement values, rather than via a self-
sufficiency orientation per se. Future studies should examine 
whether money primes and other consumer primes can pro-
duce psychologically distinct consequences.
An impressive array of research has connected the most pro-
found kinds of psychological well-being to intrinsic forms of 
motivation (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2000), yet it seems that contem-
porary cultures have come to emphasize extrinsic motivation at 
every turn. Our findings corroborate the view that individuals 
and societies pay a high price for adopting a ubiquitously con-
sumerist orientation that may undermine social cohesion. After 
all, it is by investing in efforts to connect with and benefit their 
communities that individuals often find personal happiness, 
health, and life satisfaction (Helliwell & Putnam, 2004).
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